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The eventological theory of decision-making, the theory of event-based decision-making is a theory of
decision-making based on eventological principles and using results of mathematical eventology [1]; a
theoretical basis of the practical eventology [2, 3, 4]. The beginnings of this theory which have arisen
from event-based representation of the reasonable subject and his decisions in the form of eventological
distributions (E-distributions) of sets of events [5] and which are based on the eventological H-theorem
[6] are offered. The illustrative example of the eventological decision-making by the reasonable subject on
his own event-based behaviour in the financial or share market is considered.
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1. Event Circumstances
The reasonable subject makes a decision at the coincidence of a set of events-circumstances
which is generated by his surrounding events. The reasonable subject looks at his surrounding
events through a prism of the set of events F ⊆ F , chosen by him from the algebra of events F
of the eventological space (E-space) (Ω,F ,P). Then during some moment t ∈ T coming this or
that event-terrace ter(Ft), Ft ⊆ F will be always unequivocal to correspond to any coincidence
of a set of events-circumstances. Therefore we shall agree to name these events-terraces ter(Ft)
as coincidences of a set of events-circumstances during the moment t ∈ T generated by the set
of events F which in turn we shall name the set of events-circumstances for brevity.
2. Event Decisions
Let’s assume also that at the full order of the reasonable subject there is a set of events-decisions
D ⊆ F chosen by him from the same algebra of events F . Each subset D ⊆ D corresponds to this
or that set event-based decision (the E-set-decision) of the reasonable subject. Approaches or non-
approaches of separate events-decisions d ∈ D, generated by a choice of the reasonable subject,
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mutually unequivocally characterize each his E-set-decisionD ⊆ D. Making by reasonable subject
the E-set-decision D means, that the reasonable subject chooses separate events-decisions d ∈ D
in such a manner that there come all events-decisions from D and any of Dc = D − D. The
reasonable subject creates all events-decisions from D and any of Dc = D − D. Differently,
the reasonable subject creates one of events-terraces ter(D), D ⊆ D, generated by the set of
events-decisions D.
Choosing or not choosing1 separate events-decisions d ∈ D during each moment t ∈ T , the
reasonable subject as a result gets an ability to make an eventological choice — an ability to
choose events-terraces ter(D), D ⊆ D according to the E-distribution of set of events-decisions
D ⊆ F , i.e. gets an ability to make the E-set-decisions D ⊆ D included in D according to the
E-distribution of D.
3. The Assumption of the Stationarity of Sets of Events
In the beginning we shall assume for simplicity that the set of events-decisions D and the set of
events-circumstances F do not depend on time. In other words, we shall assume a stationarity of
E-distributions of D and F, i.e. — their invariance in time.
4. A Problem of Eventological Decisions-Making
(E-Decisions-Making)
The problem of eventological decisions-making (E-decisions-making) by the reasonable subject
consists in his choice (for the set of events-circumstances F) of a such set of events-decisions D of
which E-distribution represents for the reasonable subject the greatest value as his event-based
answer to a call of F generated by surrounding events. An ability of the reasonable subject to
choose the set of events-decisions D with that or other E-distribution is equivalent to his ability
to choose the E-set-decision D ⊆ D eventologically (event-based y-probabilistically), i.e. — to
choose a way of his own event-based behaviour within the limits of the set of events-decisions D
in eventological manner ; — to choose a way which is his event-based answer to the call of any
coincidence of events-circumstances F ⊆ F of his surrounding events.
4.1. The Choice of Events-Decisions
The choice by the reasonable subject of an event-decision d ∈ D at the coincidence of a set
of events-circumstances ter(F ) is eventologically fixed by the special indicator function of two
arguments: an event-decision d and an event-terrace ter(F ), which is defined on D×F through
the Riemann’s2 zeta-function ζ defined on F × F :
1d(ter(F )) = ζ
(
ter(F ), d
)
=
{
1, ter(F ) ⊆ d,
0, otherwise.
1According to that or other coincidence of a set of events-circumstances to which an event-terraces ter(Ft)
corresponds.
2Riemann, Georg Friedrich Bernhard (1826–1866) was a German mathematician who made important contri-
butions to analysis and differential geometry, some of them paving the way for the later development of general
relativity.
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For any pair (d, F ) ∈ D× 2F ⊆ D×F we shall use the abbreviated designation:
1d(F ) = 1d(ter(F )),
and shall keep this abbreviation as well for the so-called set-indicator function
1d(F ) =
{
Ω, ter(F ) ⊆ d,
∅, otherwise,
hoping, that the context in which it will be used, will help us to avoid misunderstanding.
The just entered set-display function allows us to construct each event-decision d ∈ D from
events-terraces ter(F ), F ⊆ F mathematically by the formula:
d =
∑
F⊆F
ter(F ) ∩ 1d(F ), (1)
which can be written down in equivalent form by means of the indicator function in more bulky
kind however:
d =
∑
F : 1d(F )>0
ter(F ). (1′)
Remark 1. Formulas (1) and (1′) define each event-decision d ∈ D as a union of this or that
set of events-terraces ter(F ). In other words, events-decisions d ∈ D appear combined of events-
terraces ter(F ), generated by the set of events-circumstances F, in such a manner that each
event-terrace ter(F ) is completely contained in the event-decision d, is not intersected with it.
This fact allows to enter one more indicator function:
1D(ter(F )) = ζ
(
ter(F ), ter(D)
)
=
{
1, ter(F ) ⊆ ter(D),
0, otherwise
which we shall designate in abbreviated form
1D(F ) = 1D(ter(F )),
hoping that it also will not cause misunderstanding.
If we take advantage of a more correct, but bulky writing
1D(ter(F )) = 1ter(D)(ter(F )),
then 1D(F ) can be considered as the indicator function as original generalization of 1d(F ). These
functions are connected by a relation:
1d(F ) =
∑
ter(D)⊆d
1ter(D)(ter(F )) =
∑
d∈D
1D(F )
by virtue of that
{ter(D) ⊆ d} ⇐⇒ {d ∈ D}.
Remark 2. Formulas (1) and (1′) define the set of events-decisions D through the set of events-
circumstances F. The inverse formulas are possible when there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the set of nonempty events-terraces ter(D), D ⊆ D and the set of nonempty events-
terraces ter(F ), F ⊆ F.
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4.2. The Eventological Choice
The choice by the reasonable subject of events-decisions, which all together form the setD, enable
him an eventological choice of any E-set-decision D ⊆ D which is interpreted (by one-to-one way)
as creation of event-terrace by the reasonable subject:
ter(D) =
⋂
d∈D
d
⋂
d∈Dc
dc
where events-decisions d ∈ D are defined by formulas (1) or (1′) in full correspondence with his
eventological choice.
Let’s designate
p =
{
p(F ) = P(ter(F )), F ⊆ F
}
E-distribution of the set of events-circumstances F. Then the E-distribution
q =
{
q(D) = P(ter(D)), D ⊆ D
}
of the set of events-decisions D is connected with the E-distribution p by formulas:
q(D) =
∑
F⊆F
p(F )1D(F ), D ⊆ D, (2)
which allow to say that the reasonable subject (choosing separate events-decisions d ∈ D, in
other words, choosing this or that E-set-decision D ⊆ D) shows his ability of the eventological
choice — his ability of the E-decisions-making answering on a call of the E-distribution of F, the
set of events-circumstances.
5. E-Decisions-Making Methods
5.1. Value of an Event
A value of event [1, 5] is one of essential properties of an event, co-being of the reasonable subject;
a propensity of an event to have the importance, to be important for the reasonable subject;
that is inherent in event, makes its concrete existence; without a value an event cannot exist;
characterizes a degree of value for reasonable subject to be with, to perceive and/or to create an
event as an outcome of the being; opens a value of dual event in concepts of a value of perception
and a value of creation of event by the reasonable subject; reflects two opposite basic relations
between mind and Being; underlies the eventological laws describing the nature of objective and
subjective uncertainty; mathematically it is connected with Kolmogorov’s3 probability by the
relation value∼probability [1].
5.2. The Greatest Value Principle
We shall make bold to approve that so called the greatest value principle serves as a basis
of an eventological choice. Differently, making the eventological choice, the reasonable subject
recognizes that the event-based outcome of his choice should possess the greatest value from his
point of view. Thus a sense of the greatest value of eventological choice in details to specify there
is no necessity: the reasonable subject defines it for himself.
3Kolmogorov, Andrey Nickolaevich (1903–1987) was the great Russian mathematician; the founder of modern
probability theory; worked in the field of topology, logic, the theory of turbulence, the theory of complexity of
algorithms and in many others.
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5.3. The Matrix of a Joint E-Distribution for D and F
Let’s consider the matrix of a joint E-distribution for the set of events-decisions D and the set
of events-circumstances F:
‖pi(D,F )‖ =
{
pi(D,F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F
}
, (pi)
where4
pi(D,F ) = P(ter(D) ∩ ter(F ))
is a probability of joint coming events-terraces ter(D) and ter(F ).
5.4. The Greatest Valuable Conditional E-Distributions of D
For each event-terrace ter(F ) (which has a positive probability p(F ) > 0) conditional probabilities
q(D|F ) = P (ter(D)|ter(F )) = pi(D,F )
p(F )
of reasonable subject choice of the E-set-decision D ⊆ D at coincidence of a set of events-
circumstances F ⊆ F are defined. Conditional E-distributions{
q(D|F ), D ⊆ D}, F ⊆ F (?)
are those the greatest valuable (for the reasonable subject) E-distributions which are formed5 by
him when he eventologically chooses E-set-decisions D ⊆ D, answering coincidence of a set of
events-circumstances F ⊆ F. We shall designate
‖q(D|F )‖ =
{
q(D|F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F
}
a matrix of conditional probabilities of E-set-decisions D ⊆ D answering coincidence of a set of
events-circumstances F ⊆ F. This matrix has the greatest valuable conditional E-distributions
(?) as its lines.
Each of us has more or less sufficient experience of E-decisions-making valuable for us which
answer on a call of daily events-circumstances. We shall take advantage of this experience for
designing two methods of E-decisions-making which any reasonable subject can quite apply in
his own event-based practice.
5.5. The First Method
Let’s assume that the matrix
‖val(d, F )‖ = {val(d, F ), (d, F ) ∈ D× F},
is known and made of values val(d, F ) of a real function
val : D× F→ R,
4Here the reduced designations for events-terraces, generated by various sets of events D and F, are used:
ter(D) = terD(D), ter(F ) = terF(F ).
5On the basis of the greatest value principle.
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which are interpreted as a degree of value (by the reasonable subject) of an eventological choice
of event-decision d ∈ D at coincidence of a set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F. Thus positive
values val are interpreted as a degree of value of outcome, and negative — as a degrees of absence
of value of the outcome for the reasonable subject.
When val(d, F ) > 0 an event-decision d ∈ D can be valuably chosen by the reasonable subject
at coincidence of a set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F. In other words, events-decisions combine
from corresponding events-terraces ter(F ), for which val(d, F ) > 0 and are defined by formulas
consequently:
d =
∑
F : val(d,F )>0
ter(F ), d ∈ D.
Let’s designate
DF = {d : val(d, F ) > 0} ⊆ D
is a set of events-decisions for which val is positive at the given coincidence of a set of events-
circumstances F ⊆ F. Then conditional E-distribution of all set of events-decisions D at the
coincidence of a set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F is a singular E-distribution
q(D|F ) = δ(D,DF ) =
{
1, D = DF ,
0, otherwise,
(◦)
where δ is the delta-function, or the Kronecker’s6 symbol.
5.6. The Second Method
For each set of events-decisions D ⊆ D and each coincidence of events-circumstances F ⊆ F we
shall define value of function val by formulas
val(D,F ) =
∑
d∈D
val(d, F ),
which together taken form a matrix of values
‖val(D,F )‖ = {val(D,F ) : D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F}. (val)
Let’s designate
val(F ) =
∑
F : val(D,F )>0
val(D,F )
the sum of all positive values of function val(D,F ) for data F ⊆ F. We shall define now for
everyone F ⊆ F a conditional E-distribution q(D|F ) as follows: at val(F ) = 0 by the formula:
q(D|F ) =
{
1, D = ∅,
0, otherwise,
(◦◦)
and at val(F ) > 0 by the formula:
q(D|F ) =
{
val(D,F )/val(F ), val(F ) > 0,
0, otherwise.
(◦◦′)
6Kronecker, Leopold (1823–1891) was a German mathematician; the basic works on algebra and theory of
numbers.
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Thus the second method unlike the first one suggests to describe E-behaviour of the reasonable
subject at each coincidence of events-circumstances as a non-singular conditional E-distribution.
The second method considers the situation which is more general and offers such way of an
eventological choice of the reasonable subject when at each coincidence of events-circumstances
the reasonable subject chooses his E-behaviour how a conditional E-distribution of the general
character prompts to him. Thus his own E-distribution (defining his eventological choice within
the limits of a set of events-circumstances F) is defined by formulas of full probability
q(D) =
∑
F⊆F
q(D|F )p(F ), D ⊆ D.
5.7. The Eventological H-Theorem
The eventological H-theorem [5] is an eventological generalization of the Boltzmann’s7 H-theorem
from the statistical mechanics; a mathematical substantiation of the eventological law uniting
eventological analogue of the second law of thermodynamics: increasing entropy in the closed
thermodynamic non-alive system with its eventological contrast: decreasing entropy (increas-
ing negentropy [7]) in the open living system; proves application of Gibbsean and antiGibbsean
E-distributions [1] of sets of events (minimizing a relative entropy8) as statistical models of event-
based behaviour of the reasonable subject aspiring an equilibrium eventological choice between
his event-based perception and his event-based activity in various spheres of his co-being; the for-
mulation and the proof of the eventological H-theorem essentially base on eventological principles
[6] with which the eventology [1] begins.
Theorem (the eventological H-theorem). Let (Ω,F,P) is the E-space, X ⊆ F is the finite
set of events, V(X) is the limited set-function9 on 2X, p∗(X) is some fixed E-distribution10 on
2X, and E-distributions11 p(X) on 2X provide average value of the set-function V(X) at the given
level
〈V〉 =
∑
X⊆X
p(X)V(X). (V)
Then a minimum of a relative entropy
H p
p∗
=
∑
X⊆X
p(X) ln
p(X)
p∗(X)
→ min
p
among E-distributions p is achieved on Gibbsean and antiGibbsean E-distributions of a kind:
p(X) =
1
Zp∗
exp
{
− βV(X)
}
p∗(X), X ⊆ X, β ≥ 0,
p(X) =
1
Zp∗
exp
{
γV(X)
}
p∗(X), X ⊆ X, γ ≥ 0,
7Boltzmann, Ludwig Eduard (1844–1906) was the great Austrian physicist famous for his founding contribu-
tions in the fields of statistical mechanics and statistical thermodynamics; he first stated the logarithmic connection
between entropy and probability in his kinetic theory of gases; he stated his famous H-theorem, theoretical basis
of the second law of thermodynamics.
8Gibbsean and antiGibbsean E-distributions minimize a relative entropy between two E-distributions: the
E-distribution of event-based behaviour of the reasonable subject and his own E-distribution.
9This set-function is interpreted as a function of value (for the reasonable subject) of coming a set of events
X ⊆ X.
10This E-distribution is interpreted as an own E-distribution of the reasonable subject.
11These E-distributions are interpreted as E-distributions of an event-based behaviour of reasonable subjects.
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which can be copied without the normalizing multiplier 1/Zp∗ in the equivalent form:
p(X)
p(∅)
= exp
{
− β(V(X)− V(∅))
}p∗(X)
p∗(∅)
, X ⊆ X,
p(X)
p(∅)
= exp
{
γ(V(X)− V(∅))
}p∗(X)
p∗(∅)
, X ⊆ X.
5.8. The Method Based on the Eventological H-Theorem
We form the new set of events
X = D+ F
by the operation of union of the set of events-decisions D and the set of events-circumstances F.
To each pair of subsets of events-decisions D ⊆ D and events-circumstances F ⊆ F the subset of
events
X = X ∩D+X ∩ F = D + F ⊆ X
one-to-one corresponds. The E-distribution {p(X), X ⊆ X} of the set of events X is the joint
E-distribution
{pi(D,F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F}
of two sets of events D and F, which have been defined (pi) in the paragraph 5.3., as
pi(D,F ) = P (terD(D) ∩ terF(F )) = P (terX(X)) = p(X), X ⊆ X.
Eventological principles [5] follows, that on all subsets of set of events X the function of values
is defined:
V(X), X ⊆ X,
values of which serve as elements of the matrix of values ‖val(D,F )‖ of pairs of events from sets
D and F which have been defined (val) in the paragraph 5.6., as
V(X) = V(D + F ) = val(D,F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F.
Let’s designate
{p∗(X), X ⊆ X} = {p∗(D + F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F}
the own E-distribution of the reasonable subject which can be estimated from his own historical
statistics
{terX(Xt), t ∈ T} = {terD+F(Dt + Ft), t ∈ T}
received for some previous time interval T .
By virtue of the eventological H-theorem the event-based behaviour of the reasonable subject
at given:
• the own E-distribution p∗;
• the function of value V;
• the fixed level of average value 〈V〉
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should submit to the E-distribution of a kind
p(D + F )
p(∅)
= exp
{
α(V(D + F )− V(∅))
}p∗(D + F )
p∗(∅)
, D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F, (H)
where
• values of function of value V(X) are interpreted by a double way:
? V(X) > 0 is a value of perception of the set of events X ⊆ X,
? V(X) < 0 is a value of creation of the set of events X ⊆ X;
• the parameter α > 0 characterizes the inverse average ability of the reasonable subject to
perceive and to create sets of events.
In particular the E-distribution (H) follows, that at the coincidence of the set of events-
circumstances F ⊆ F (p(F ) > 0) the event-based behaviour of the reasonable subject should
submit to the greatest valuable conditional E-distribution (see (?) in the paragraph 5.4.) of a
kind: {
q(D|F ) = p(D + F )
p(F )
, D ⊆ D
}
, (H?)
which serves as the eventological instruction for the reasonable subject and defines, what E-
decisions have the greatest value as his event-based answer to a call of set of events of circum-
stances F ⊆ F.
6. Example of E-Decisions-Making
Let’s consider a situation when the reasonable subject is making E-decisions on his behaviour
in the financial or stock market, for example, within the limits of the tenders on currency or
stock exchange. The reasonable subject is making E-decisions on the basis of his own historical
E-statistics {ter(Ft) : t ∈ T} about the finite set of events-circumstances F. These events-
circumstances selected by the reasonable subject came or did not come during the moments of
time t ∈ T from some finite set T before the moment of the E-decisions-making.
One events-circumstances F are generated by technical characteristics others are generated
by fundamental characteristics of the tenders and are called as technical or fundamental events-
circumstances accordingly.
6.1. Technical Events-Circumstances
Let’s designate {at, t ∈ T} a set of stock quotes of one kind or a rate of one currency in relation
to another, and {bt, t ∈ T} a set of volumes of their sales during the corresponding moments
of time t ∈ T . We shall designate also
{a(1)t , t ∈ T}, {a(2)t , t ∈ T},
{b(1)t , t ∈ T}, {b(2)t , t ∈ T}
corresponding sliding averages of stock quotes and sales volumes accordingly for n1 +1 and n2 +1
at the previous moments of time:
a
(1)
t =
1
n1 + 1
t∑
τ=t−n1
aτ , a
(2)
t =
1
n2 + 1
t∑
τ=t−n2
aτ ,
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b
(1)
t =
1
n1 + 1
t∑
τ=t−n1
bτ , b
(2)
t =
1
n2 + 1
t∑
τ=t−n2
bτ .
On the basis of these characteristics of the tenders it is possible to define three technical events-
circumstances:
f (1) =
{
at ≥ a(1)t
}
, f (2) =
{
at ≥ a(2)t
}
, f (3) =
{
a
(1)
t ≥ a(2)t
}
.
6.2. Fundamental Events-Circumstances
In the example fundamental events-circumstances are defined as follows:
f (4) =
⋃
f∈F(4)
f, f (5) =
⋃
f∈F(5)
f, f (6) =
⋃
f∈F(4)
f.
Each of these three events-circumstances corresponds to coming even one12 events-circumstances
f ∈ F(i) from a set of events13 F(i), i = 4, 5, 6, coming in three corresponding spheres of a society
— economic, political and social one and the most valuable to increase of quotes of the financial
tool considered.
6.3. The Set of Events-Circumstances
In the example the set of events-circumstances is made by the reasonable subject of six events-
circumstances:
F =
{
f (1), f (2), f (3), f (4), f (5), f (6)
}
,
among which three: f (1), f (2) and f (3) are technical and three: f (4), f (5) and f (6) are fundamental.
Thus, for the E-decisions-making the reasonable subject is going to analyze events-circumstances
in the currency or stock market through a prism of the sextet of events F selected by him. In
other words, the reasonable subject is going to consider only 64 = 26 variants of a coincidence
of events-circumstances F ⊆ F, or, that is the same, a coming 64 corresponding events-terraces:
ter(F ) =
⋂
f∈F
f
⋂
f∈F c
f c, F ⊆ F,
where f c = Ω − f is a complement of the event-circumstance f up to Ω, and F c = F − F is a
complement of the set of events-circumstances F up to F.
6.4. The Set of Events-Decisions
In the example the set of events-decisions of the reasonable subject, where he makes E-decisions
in the currency or stock market, consists of two events-decisions:
D = {d+, d−},
where
d+ = {a sale of the financial tool},
12The logic statement coming even one event corresponds to the set-operation union of events which here
should be considered only as popular, but rather particular variant of the any set-operation also quite admissible
for definition of events-circumstances in a problem of E-decisions-making.
13Economic, political and social events-circumstances, forming sets F(i), i = 4, 5, 6, should be defined and
chosen by the reasonable subject before he will start to make the E-decisions.
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d− = {a purchase of the financial tool}.
In any situation the doublet of events-decisions D partitions the space of outcomes of Being Ω
on 4 = 22 events-terraces each of which can be written down in a canonical form [1]:
ter(D) =
⋂
d∈D
d
⋂
d∈Dc
dc, D ⊆ D.
According to their definition these events-terraces are easy for writing out in a form of inter-
section of two events and for resulting their obvious interpretation also:
• ter(∅) = (d+)c ∩ (d−)c — to do nothing,
• ter({d+}) = d+ ∩ (d−)c — only to sell,
• ter({d−}) = (d+)c ∩ d− — only to buy,
• ter({d+, d−}) = d+ ∩ d− — to sell and to buy.
Interpretation of event-terrace ter({d+, d−}) to sell and to buy can to mean, for example, that
the reasonable subject sells the one part of the financial tools, and buys the other part.
If it is impossible it is necessary to assume that events-decisions are not intersected, i.e. that
ter({d+, d−}) = d+ ∩ d− = ∅.
The doublet of not intersected events-decisions D partitions the space of outcomes of Being Ω
on three events-terraces only:
• ter(∅) = (d+)c ∩ (d−)c — to do nothing,
• ter({d+}) = d+ — only to sell,
• ter({d−}) = d− — only to buy.
6.5. The Matrix of Values
In the example it is offered to estimate the matrix of values for the reasonable subject
‖val(d, F )‖ = {val(d, F ), (d, F ) ∈ D× F}
from historical statistics {
ter(Ft) : Ft ⊆ F
}
.
An each element of the matrix is statistically estimated under the formula:
val(d, F ) = (−1)δ(d,d−)
(
1
|TF |
∑
t∈TF
(at − at−1)
)
, ()
where TF =
{
t ∈ T Ft = F
} ⊆ T is the subset of the moments from T in which the coincidence
of events-circumstances Ft coincided with F ⊆ F, and |TF | is a number of such moments (power
of the subset TF ).
Now for each set of events-decisions D ⊆ D and for each coincidence of events-circumstances
F ⊆ F the function val, earlier defined on D×2F, is defined on greater set 2D×2F under formulas
val(D,F ) =
∑
d∈D
val(d, F ). ()
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These values of val, taken all together, form the matrix of values
‖val(D,F )‖ = {val(D,F ) (D,F ) ∈ 2D × 2F}.
The further estimation of conditional E-distributions of the reasonable subject is spent meth-
ods using elements of the matrix of degrees of values estimated under formulas () and/or ()
are put.
6.6. The First Method
Each event-decision d ∈ D is chosen by the reasonable subject at the coincidence of events-
circumstances F ⊆ F for which val(d, F ) > 0, in other words, it is defined by a formula:
d =
∑
F : val(d,F )>0
ter(F ), d ∈ D.
Let
DF = {d : val(d, F ) > 0} ⊆ D
is a set of all such events-decisions for which val is positive at the given F ⊆ F. Thus, the
reasonable subject at the given F ⊆ F creates the event-terrace
ter(DF ) =
⋂
d∈DF
d
⋂
d∈(DF )c
dc,
corresponding to the set of events-decisions DF , i.e. he creates all events-decisions from DF and
does not create any event-decision from (DF )c = D−DF .
6.7. The Second Method
Let
valΣ(F ) =
∑
F : val(D,F )>0
val(D,F )
be the sum of all positive values of function val(D,F ) for the given F ⊆ F. Now for everyone
F ⊆ F the conditional E-distribution q(D|F ) is defined:
• at valΣ(F ) = 0 by the formula:
q(D|F ) =
{
1, D = ∅,
0, otherwise;
(◦◦)
• at valΣ(F ) > 0 by the formula:
q(D|F ) =
{
val(D,F )/val(F ), val(F ) > 0,
0, otherwise.
(◦◦′)
This conditional E-distribution q(D|F ) generalizes the behaviour of the reasonable subject recom-
mended by the first method, indicating for everyone D ⊆ D probabilities q(D|F ) of creating the
given set of events-decisions by the reasonable subject (under the condition of coming the set of
events-circumstances F ⊆ F).
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In other words the second method offers for the reasonable subject (if to use terminology of
the games theory) not pure strategies (as the first method) but a mixed strategy of his event-
based behaviour which is defined by the conditional E-distribution {q(D|F ), D ⊆ D}. The fact
that the reasonable subject is capable to carry out an eventological choice14 of events-decisions
according to the conditional E-distribution follows from the general E-principles [1, 5].
6.8. The Method Based on the Eventological H-Theorem
Let’s
1) define on 2D+F the function of value V by formulas
V(D + F ) = val(D,F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F,
where val(D,F ) are calculated by formulas () and ();
2) estimate the own E-distribution p∗(D + F ) of the reasonable subject from the historical
statistics
{terD+F(Dt + Ft), t ∈ T}
of his event-based behaviour D, answered calls F for some previous interval T ;
3) fix some average level of valuable preferences of the reasonable subject 〈V〉.
Then it follows from the eventological H-theorems (H) follows that at the coincidence of
the set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F (p(F ) > 0) the event-based behaviour of the reasonable
subject should submit to the greatest valuable conditional E-distribution (see (?) in the paragraph
5.4.) of a kind: {
q(D|F ) = p(D + F )
p(F )
, D ⊆ D
}
, (H?)
which serves as the eventological instruction for the reasonable subject and defines, what E-
decisions have the greatest value as his event-based answer to a call of the set of events of
circumstances F ⊆ F.
7. Conclusion
When the reasonable subject makes a decision at coincidence of sets of events-circumstances,
submitting to the E-distribution, at his disposal as the current result of his event-based experience
is available the own set of events-decisions with the E-distribution which defines his eventological
choice. The joint E-distribution of these two sets of events describes event-based behaviour of
the reasonable subject — making the most valuable event-based decisions by him in various
circumstances of his co-being.
The offered event-based sight at the decision-making, based on the eventological H-theorem
[6], a basis of the eventological theory of decision-making which unifies and expands opportunities
of the classical theory, allowing to compare situations of making the most valuable event-based
decisions by various reasonable subjects at various event-based circumstances in eventological
manner.
14The some part of reasonable subjects does not trust this ability of their reason and are convinced, that for
their eventological choice they need to do nothing except for as to throw a coin, and it is vain.
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